Nearly all modern hash functions are constructed by iterating a compression function. At FSE'04, Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS04] formalized seven security notions for hash functions: collision resistance (Coll) and three variants of second-preimage resistance (Sec, aSec, eSec) and preimage resistance (Pre, aPre, ePre). The main contribution of this paper is in determining, by proof or counterexample, which of these seven notions is preserved by each of eleven existing iterations. Our study points out that none of them preserves more than three notions from [RS04]. In particular, only a single iteration preserves Pre, and none preserves Sec, aSec, or aPre. The latter two notions are particularly relevant for practice, because they do not rely on the problematic assumption that practical compression functions be chosen uniformly from a family. In view of this poor state of affairs, even the mere existence of seven-property-preserving iterations seems uncertain. As a second contribution, we propose the new Random-Oracle XOR (ROX) iteration that is the first to provably preserve all seven notions, but that, quite controversially, uses a random oracle in the iteration. The compression function itself is not modeled as a random oracle though. Rather, ROX uses an auxiliary small-input random oracle (typically 170 bits) that is called only a logarithmic number of times.
practical hash functions however do not have explicit keys. In fact, it is not even clear what the family is that they belong to, so it is rather contrived to regard SHA-256 as a randomly drawn member of such a family. Instead, the always-notions aSec and aPre capture the intuition that a hash function ought to be (second-)preimage resistant for all members of the family, so that it doesn't matter which one is actually used. Alternatively, one could see the aSec and aPre notions as the the natural extensions to (second-)preimage resistance of Rogaway's human-ignorance approach to collision-resistant hashing with unkeyed compression functions [Rog06] . (See [ANPS07b] for a subsequent work on property preservation for iterations of unkeyed compression functions.) In this sense, the aSec and aPre notions strengthen the standard notions of second-preimage resistance and preimage resistance, respectively, in the way needed to say that a fixed function such as SHA-256 is Sec and Pre secure. They therefore inherit the practical applications of Sec and Pre security, and are thus the right notions to consider when instantiating Cramer-Shoup encryption or Unix-like password storage with a fixed function like SHA-256. The formal definitions of all seven notions are recalled in Section 2.
Existing constructions. Let us now take a closer look at a number of existing constructions to see which of the seven notions of [RS04] they preserve. Our findings are summarized in Table 1 , which we see as the main research contribution of our paper. Except for the few entries in the table with question marks, we come up with either proofs or counterexamples in support of our claims. We found for example that the ubiquitous SMD construction preserves Coll and ePre security, but surprisingly fails to preserve any of the other notions. In fact, all of the examined schemes preserve ePre; intuitively, if all of the range of the (randomly keyed) compression function is hard to invert, then iterating produces a function whose range is similarly hard to invert. Apart from ePre, most schemes preserve only collision resistance. These schemes include SMD and the more recent EMD, HAIFA, and Randomized hash. Of the eleven schemes in the table, none preserves all seven notions. In fact, the best-performing constructions in terms of property preservation are the XOR Linear hash and Shoup's hash, which still preserve only three of the seven notions (Coll, eSec, and ePre). The XOR Tree hash is the only iteration to preserve Pre, and none of the schemes preserve Sec, aSec or aPre. Remember that the latter two are particularly relevant for the security of practical hash functions because they do not rely on the compression functions being chosen at random from a family.
Preserving all properties: the ROX Construction. This rather poor state of affairs may leave one wondering whether preserving all seven notions is possible at all. We answer this question in the affirmative, but, quite controversially, were only able to do so in the random oracle model. We explicitly do not model the compression function itself as a random oracle however. While we view the main interest of our construction to be a feasibility result for seven-property-preserving hashing, we do have reasons to believe that our construction makes very "reasonable" use of the random oracle. Allow us to explain.
Our Random-Oracle-XOR (ROX) construction draws largely on the XOR-linear hash [BR97] and Shoup's hash [Sho00] . Both are extensions of the original MD construction that XOR a mask into the chaining value prior to application of the compression function. Shoup's construction requires only a logarithmic number of masks (in the length of the message), which is an improvement over the linear number required in Bellare and Rogaway's XOR-linear hash. Moreover, Mironov [Mir01] proves that Shoup's mask scheduling is optimal. We, too, require a logarithmic number of masks, and we apply the masks according to Shoup's algorithm. Our masks, however, are generated by applying a random oracle to a sequence of strings (K, m, i ) that consist of the compression function key K of length k, the first k bits of the message, and an encoding of a counter i. For a typical security level of k = 80, this means we only need a random oracle with 170-bit inputs. To hash an -block message, we query the random oracle on a number of domain points that is logarithmic in; for example, if |M | = 2 64 bits and blocks are 512 bits long, we need at most 56 random oracle calls. We also use a random oracle to create a padding string; this adds a small, constant number (e.g., two) of calls to a 140-bit random [RS04] . The symbol "Y" means that the notion is provably preserved by the construction; "N" means that it is not preserved, in the sense that we come up with a counterexample; "?" means that neither proof nor counterexample are known. Underlined entries were known, all other results are new.
Scheme
Coll Sec aSec eSec Pre aPre ePre
Strengthened MD [Mer90b, Dam90] Tree Hash [BR97] 
oracle.This limited use of the random oracle has the important practical ramification that the function instantiating it need not be as efficient as the compression function, and can therefore be made with large security margins. We'll come back to candidate instantiations in Section 4. The idea of generating the masks through a random oracle is not new; in fact, it was explicitly suggested at two separate occasions by Mironov [Mir01, Mir06] . The idea was discarded in [Mir01] for trivializing the problem, but was revisited in [Mir06] as a viable way to obtain shorter keys for eSecsecure hashing. Indeed, if one assumes the existence of random oracles with very large domains, then one can simply use the random oracle to do the hashing. The ROX construction, on the other hand, still uses a real compression function in the chaining, and uses a small-domain random oracle to preserve all seven notions of [RS04] using a very short key, including the important aSec and aPre notions. 1 Moreover, we do so without changing the syntax of the compression function [BD06] or doubling its output size [Luc05] , both of which can come at a considerable performance penalty.
What about other properties? The seven security notions formalized by [RS04] are certainly not the only ones that are of interest. Kelsey and Kohno [KK06] suggest chosen-target forced-prefix security, which can be seen as a special form of multi-collision resistance, as the right goal to stop Nostradamus attacks. Bellare and Ristenpart [BR06] , following previous work by Coron et al. [CDMP05] and Bellare et al. [BCK96] , formalize pseudorandom oracle preservation (PRO-Pr) and pseudorandom function preservation (PRF-Pr) as goals. Their EMD construction is shown to be PRO-Pr, PRFPr and to preserve collision resistance. More recently, and independently of this work, Bellare and Ristenpart [BR07] study the Coll, eSec, PRO, PRF, and MAC (unforgeability) preservation of various iterations, including the SMD, Prefix-free MD, Shoup, and EMD iterations that we study. Their work does not cover the five other notions of [RS04] , while our work does not cover the PRO, PRF, and MAC properties. We leave the study of the preservation of these properties by our ROX construction to future work.
Security Definitions
In this section, we explain the security notions for hash functions of [RS04] . Let us begin by establishing some notation. Let N = {0, 1, . . .} be the set of natural numbers and {0, 1} * be the set of all bit strings. If k ∈ N, then {0, 1} k denotes the set of all k-bit strings and {0, 1} k× * denotes the set of all bit strings of length an integer multiple of k. The empty string is denoted ε. If b is a bit then b denotes its complement. If x is a string and i ∈ N, then x (i) is the i-th bit of x and x i is the concatenation of i copies of x. If x, y are strings, then x y is the concatenation of x and y. If k, l ∈ N then k l is the encoding of k as an l-bit string. We occasionally write k when the length is clear from the context. If S is a set, then x $ ← S denotes the uniformly random selection of an element from S. We let y ← A(x) and y $ ← A(x) be the assignment to y of the output of a deterministic and randomized algorithm A, respectively, when run on input x.
An adversary is an algorithm, possibly with access to oracles. To avoid trivial lookup attacks, it will be our convention to include in the time complexity of an adversary A its running time and its code size (relative to some fixed model of computation).
Security Notions for Keyed Hash Functions. Formally, a hash function family is a function H : K × M → Y where the key space K and the target space Y are finite sets of bit strings. The message space M could be infinitely large; we only assume that there exists at least one λ ∈ N such that {0, 1} λ ⊆ M. We treat (fixed input length) compression functions and (variable input length) hash functions just the same, the former being simply a special case of the latter.
For an adversary A attacking a hash function H we define the following advantage measures:
These are the seven security notions from Rogaway-Shrimpton [RS04] : the standard three of collisionresistance (Coll), preimage-resistance (Pre) and second-preimage-resistance (Sec); and the always-and everywhere-variants of (second)-preimage-resistance (aPre, aSec, ePre and eSec).
For atk ∈ {Coll, eSec, ePre}, we define Adv 
Note that fixed-length compression functions have M = {0, 1} λ , so that atk[λ]-security and atk-security are actually equivalent. When giving results in the random oracle model, we also account for the total number of queries q RO that the adversary makes to its random oracles. In this case, we will write (t, q RO , )-secure with the obvious meaning.
Note that the security notions above do not insist that the colliding message M be of length λ. It is our conscious choice to focus on arbitrary-length security here, meaning that adversaries may find collisions between messages of varying lengths. In practice, the whole purpose of hash iterations is to extend the domain of a compression function to arbitrary lengths, so it makes perfect sense to require that the hash function withstands attacks using messages of different lengths.
Properties Preserved by Existing Constructions
In this section we take a closer look at eleven hash iterations that previously appeared in the literature, and check which of the seven security properties from [RS04] they preserve. The algorithms are described in Figure 1 , the results of our analysis are summarized in Table 1 .
As mentioned in the previous section, we focus on arbitrary-length security in this paper. Allowing for arbitrary-length message attacks invariably seems to require some sort of message padding (unstrengthened MD does not preserve collision resistance), but care must be taken when deciding on the padding method: one method does not fit all. This was already observed by Bellare and Rogaway [BR97] , who proposed an alternative form of strengthening where a final block containing the message length is appended and processed with a different key than the rest of the iteration. This works fine in theory, but since current compression functions are not keyed, it is not clear how this construction should be instantiated in practice. In absence of a practical generic solution, we chose to add standard one-zeroes padding and length strengthening to all chaining iterations that were originally proposed without strengthening. For tree iterations we use one-zeroes padding for the message input at the leaves, and at the root make one extra call to the compression function on input the accumulated hash value concatenated with the message length. (Standard length strengthening at the leaves fails to preserve even collision resistance here.) These strengthening methods sometimes help but never harm for property preservation.
Chaining Iterations
Strengthened Merkle-Damgård. The Strengthened Merkle-Damgård (SMD) construction is known to preserve collision resistance [Dam90] and to not preserve eSec security [BR97] . In the following two theorems we prove that it also preserves ePre security, but does not preserve Sec, aSec, Pre, and aPre security. τ F is the time required for an evaluation of F and = (λ + 2n)/b where λ = |M |.
Theorem 3.1 If F is (t , ) ePre-secure, then SMD F is (t, ) ePre-secure for = and t = t − · τ F .
Proof: Given an ePre-adversary A against SMD F , consider the following ePre-adversary B against F.
B runs A to obtain the target value Y and outputs the same string Y . When it gets a random key K it runs A on the same key to obtain a preimage message M . Let m 1 . . . m ← ls-pad(M ) and let h −1
Padding algorithms:
where
where 
n . Tree iterations SMT , TH , and XTH use a compression function
n are fixed initialization vectors. Padding algorithms are given on the bottom right; pf-pad(M ) and sf-pad(M ) are any prefix-free padding and suffix-free padding algorithms, respectively. The function ν(i) is the largest integer j such that 2 j |i.
be the one-but-last chaining value computed in an execution of SMD F (K, M ). Algorithm B outputs m h −1 as its own preimage.
While at first sight the above proof may seem to go through for Pre and aPre security as well, this is not the case. The target point Y in a Pre attack on F is distributed as F(K, m h) for a random m h $ ← {0, 1} b+n . But the target point for the iterated structure SMD F is generated as
These two distributions can actually be very different, as is illustrated by the following counterexample. Proof: For any compression function G, consider CE 1 given by
If G is (t, ) atk secure, then CE 1 is (t, − 1/2 n ) atk secure; we refer to Appendix A.1 for the proof.
From the construction of CE 1 , it is clear that SMD Proof: For any compression function G, consider CE 2 given by
In Appendix A.2 we prove that if G is (t, ) atk-secure for atk ∈ {Coll, eSec}, then CE 2 is (t, ) atksecure. When iterating CE 2 through LH CE 2 with independent keys XOR-Linear Hash. The XOR-Linear Hash (XLH ) [BR97] uses keys that consist of a compression function key K and masking keys K 1 , . . . , K ∈ {0, 1} n . It is known to preserve eSec security [BR97] .
It can also be seen to preserve Coll and ePre by similar arguments as used for SMD and LH . Counterexample CE 1 can be used to show that aSec and aPre are not preserved: the adversary gets to choose the key in these notions, so it can choose K 1 = . . . = K = 0 n so that XLH boils down to SMD. In the following we show that the XLH construction does not preserve Sec or Pre security either. Proof: For any λ ≤ 2 b and compression function G, consider CE 3 given by
In Appendix A.3 we prove that if G is (t, ) Sec or Pre-secure, then CE 3 is (t, + 1/2 b ) Sec or Presecure. It is easy to see that, when iterated through XLH CE 3 , the hash of any λ-bit message is 0 n .
A Pre[λ] adversary can therefore simply output any
Shoup's Hash. The iteration due to Shoup (SH ) [Sho00] is similar to the XOR-Linear hash but uses a different key scheduling that reduces the key length to logarithmic in the message length, rather than linear. Shoup's hash is known to preserve eSec-security [Sho00] , and it can be shown to preserve Coll and ePre-security as well. The proofs are very similar to the case of SMD, and hence omitted. Counterexample CE 1 disproves preservation of aSec and aPre-security, and counterexample CE 3 disproves preservation of Sec and Pre.
Prefix-free Merkle-Damgård. It was shown in [BR06] that the prefix-free Merkle-Damgård construction (PfMD) [CDMP05] does not preserve Coll security. The counterexample of [BR97] can also be used to show that it does not preserve eSec, and counterexample CE 1 can be used to disprove the preservation of Sec, aSec, Pre and aPre. Finally, using a proof similar to that for SMD, one can show that ePre-security is preserved.
Another variant of PfMD by [CDMP05] prepends the message length encoding to the message in advance. The security results of this scheme easily follow from the ones for the SMD construction.
Randomized hash. The Randomized Hash (RH ) [HK06] XORs each message block with a random value R ∈ {0, 1} b . The construction was originally proved to be eSec secure by making stronger assumptions on the underlying compression function. Its pure security preservation characteristics (i.e., assuming only the eSec security of the compression function) were never studied. In our security analysis of RH treating the value R as either randomness per message or fixed long term key yields identical results with respect to seven property preservation.
By arguments similar to the case of SMD, one can show that RH preserves Coll and ePre security, but none of the other notions are preserved. Counterexample CE 1 can be used to contradict preservation of Sec, aSec, Pre, and ePre, and the counterexample of [BR97] can be used to contradict preservation of eSec.
HAIFA. While the newly proposed HAsh Iterative FrAmework (HAIFA) [BD06] does preclude a number of specific attacks [Dea99, KS05, KK06] to which SMD admits, they perform exactly the same in terms of preservation of our security notions. Similar proofs as for SMD can be used to show that HAIFA preserves Coll and ePre-security, counterexample CE 1 can be used to contradict the preservation of Sec, aSec, Pre, and aPre, and the counterexample of [BR97] applies to contradict preservation of eSec.
Enveloped Merkle-Damgård. The enveloped Merkle-Damgård (EMD) construction [BR06] is known to preserve Coll, pseudorandom-oracle, and pseudo-random function behavior. For the seven security notions that we consider, however, it does not perform better than SMD. Counterexample CE 1 of Theorem 3.2 can be used (setting IV = IV 2 ) to show that neither of Sec, aSec, Pre, or aPre are preserved. An adaptation of the counterexample of [BR97] shows that eSec is not preserved either. Preservation of ePre on the other hand can be proved in a similar way as done in Theorem 3.1.
Tree Iterations
Strengthened Merkle Tree. We consider here the strengthened Merkle tree [Mer80] , the Tree Hash [BR97] , and the XOR Tree Hash [BR97] . For conciseness we do not cover other tree iterations that have appeared in the literature (e.g. [LCL + 03, Sar05]). The Merkle tree [Mer80] in its most basic form (i.e., without length strengthening) suffers from a similar anomaly as basic Merkle-Damgård in that it does not preserve Coll for arbitrary-length messages. We therefore consider the strengthened variant SMT here, depicted in Figure 1 . We believe SMT is commonly known to preserve Coll, but we reprove this in Appendix A.4 for completeness. The notion of ePre is easily seen to be preserved as well. It can be seen not to preserve eSec by a counterexample similar to that of [BR97] given in Appendix A.4. SMT also fails to preserve Sec, aSec, Pre, and aPre however, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5 For any atk ∈ {Sec, aSec, Pre, aPre}, if there exists a (t , ) atk-secure compression function G : K × {0, 1} an → {0, 1} n−2 , then there exists a (t, ) atk-secure compression function CE 4 : K × {0, 1} an → {0, 1} n for = + 1/2 n−1 , t = t , and an adversary A running in one step time with
Proof: For any compression function G, consider CE 4 given by
We prove in Appendix A.4 that the bounds mentioned above hold for the atk security of CE 4 . It is easy to see that, due to the one-zeroes padding to a d bits, any message of length
hashes to 1 n , leading to trivial constant-time attacks for any such length λ.
Tree Hash. The unstrengthened Tree Hash (TH ) was proposed in [BR97] for same-length messages;
we consider the strengthened variant here. It is a variant of SMT where at each level i of the tree the compression functions use an independent key K i . It can be seen to preserve ePre for the same reasons as the SMT construction. Our counterexample CE 4 can be used to exhibit the non-preservation of Sec, aSec, Pre and aPre security. The case of Coll and eSec are a bit more subtle, but the counterexample below shows that TH does not preserve these either. Theorem 3.6 For any atk ∈ {Coll, eSec}, if there exists a (t , ) atk-secure compression function G : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} an → {0, 1} n−1 , then there exists a (t, ) atk-secure compression function CE 5 : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} an → {0, 1} n for = , t = t , such that there exists an eSec-adversary breaking the eSec security of TH CE 5 in constant time with advantage 1/4.
Proof: For any compression function G, consider CE 5 given by
(1)
We prove in Appendix A.5 that CE 5 is (t, ) atk-secure whenever G is (t, ) atk-secure, for atk ∈ {Coll, eSec}.
Note that tpad M = (10 n−1 ) a−1 = (10 n−1 ) a and tpad M = (10 n−1 ) a 2 −1 = (10 n−1 ) a 2 , where tpad is the tree padding algorithm of Figure 1 . If TH CE 5 is instantiated with keys K 1 K 2 K 3 such that K
the adversary that outputs M and M as colliding message pair has advantage 1/4 in winning the Coll and eSec games.
XOR Tree. The unstrengthened XOR Tree (XTH ) was proposed in [BR97] for fixed-length messages; we consider the strengthened variant here. It is again a variant of the Merkle tree, where the inputs to the compression functions on level i are XORed with a key K i ∈ {0, 1} an . As for all other iterations, it is straightforward to see that XTH preserves ePre; we omit the proof. Quite remarkably, the masking of the entire input to the compression function makes it the only iteration in the literature that preserves Pre, while at the same time it seems to stand in the way of even proving preservation of Coll. It does not preserve aSec or aPre because the adversary can choose K i = 0 an and apply counterexample CE 4 . We were unable to come up with either proof or counterexample for Coll, Sec, and eSec, leaving these as an open question. We prove the preservation of Pre below. 
The ROX Construction
We are now ready to present in detail our Random-Oracle-XOR (ROX) construction. Let F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} b+n → {0, 1} n be a fixed-length compression function. Let 2 l be the maximum message length in bits; typically one would use k = 80 and l = 64. The construction uses two random oracles RO 1 :
. These random oracles can be built from a single one by adding an extra bit to the input that distinguishes calls to RO 1 and RO 2 . Our construction can be thought of as a variant of Shoup's hash, but with the masks being generated by RO 1 and the padding being generated by RO 2 . More precisely, on input a message M , our padding function rox-pad outputs a sequence of b-bit message blocks
where m are the first k bits of M and λ = |M |. The padding adds a number of bits generated by RO 2 such that the final block m contains at least 2n bits generated by RO 2 , possibly resulting in an extra block consisting solely of padding. It is worth noting though that we do not have a separate length strengthening block. We assume that λ ≥ k because aPre security, and therefore seven-propertypreservation as a whole, do not make sense for short messages. Indeed, the adversary can always exhaustively try the entire message space. To hash shorter messages, one should add a random salt to the message.
Let ν(i) be the largest integer j such that 2 j divides i, let IV ∈ {0, 1} n be an initialization vector, and let m be the first k bits of the message M . Our construction is described in pseudocode below; a graphical representation is given in Figure 2 . 2 (m, λ , 1 ) ... We want to stress that that the ROX construction does not require that the compression function accept an additional input that might be influenced by the attacker (such as a salt or a counter). We see this as an important advantage, since imposing additional requirements on the compression function may make compression functions even harder to design or less efficient.
It is quite standard in cryptography for new primitives to first find instantiations in the random oracle model, only much later to be replaced with constructions in the standard model. It is interesting to see how the random oracles in the ROX construction can be instantiated if one were to implement it in practice. For an 80-bit security level, our results suggest that we should take k = 80 and n = 160. This means that we need a random oracle that reduces about 170 bits to 160 bits. A first suggestion is to re-use the compression function with, say, three times as many rounds as normal, and with different values of the constants. This approach violates good cryptographic hygiene, however, by having the design of the random oracle depend on that of the surrounding scheme. A better proposal is to use one or more calls to a blockcipher like AES that is designed independently of the compression function.
Properties Preserved by the ROX Construction
The following theorem states that the ROX construction preserves all seven security properties that we consider here. We give a proof sketch for the preservation of Coll and a full proof for aSec below; the other proofs can be found in Appendix B. We only note that the proofs for Sec, aSec and eSec are in the programmable random oracle model [Nie02] ; that for the case of Pre and aPre non-programmable random oracles suffice; and that Coll and ePre are preserved in the standard model. Theorem 5.1 For atk ∈ {Coll, Sec, eSec, aSec, Pre, ePre, aPre}, if the compression function F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} b+n → {0, 1} n is (t , ) atk-secure, then the iterated function ROX F is (t, q RO , ) atk-secure for
Here, τ F is the time required for an evaluation of F and = (λ + 2n)/b where λ = |M |.
We repeat that above we do not model the compression function as a random oracle, but it is worth considering what the equations tell us if we do. Assuming for simplicity that τ F = 1, we know that a collision adversary running in t = 2 n/2 steps has probability about 1/2 to find collisions in F, due to the birthday paradox, but only has probability = 2 −n/2 to find preimages or second preimages. Nevertheless, existing iterations cannot guarantee (second) preimage resistance against 2 n/2 -time adversaries, because they merely inherit their (second) preimage resistance by implication from collision resistance. 2 The ROX construction, on the other hand, can. Assuming that queries to RO 1 , RO 2 take unit time and taking k = n, Equations (2), (3), (6) imply that an adversary running in time t = 2 n/2 − 2 ≈ 2 n/2 steps has probability at most = · 2 −n/2 + 2 n/2−k + 2 −n ≈ ( + 1) · 2 −n/2 to find second preimages, and has probability at most = 2 −n/2 + 2 n/2−n ≈ 2 −n/2+1 to find preimages.
An interesting question is whether Equation (3) implies that ROX protects against the attack by Kelsey and Schneier [KS05] that finds second preimages in SMD for a 2 κ -block message in κ · 2 n/2+1 + 2 n−κ+1 time. On the positive side, the same attack does not seem to extend to ROX, because no two consecutive blocks are ever processed using the same masks. To the best of our knowledge, the only way to build the expandable message structure without ruining the mask schedule is by computing κ-multi-collisions instead of collisions, which come at a cost of 2 (κ−1)n/κ each. On the negative side, Equation (3) loses a factor in the reduction, so in principle it cannot exclude the existence of a Sec attack for 2 n/2 -block messages in 2 n/2 work. It does however exclude such attacks for short messages. As shown in Section 3, SMD cannot provide such a guarantee. (2): If M, M is a pair of colliding messages, then consider the two chains of compression function calls in the computation of ROX F (K, M ) = ROX F (K, M ). If the inputs to the final call to F are different for M and M , then these inputs form a collision on F and we're done. If they are the same, then remember that at least 2n bits of these inputs are the output of RO 2 (m, λ , i ) and RO 2 (m , λ , j ), respectively. If these are different queries to RO 2 , yet their outputs are the same, then the adversary must have found a collision on RO 2 ; the odds of it doing so are bounded by q 2 RO /2 2n . If these queries are the same, however, then we have that m = m and λ = λ , and therefore that the masks in both chains µ i = µ i = RO 1 (K, m, i ). Identical chaining inputs to -th call to F must therefore be caused by identical outputs of the ( − 1)-st call to F. If the inputs to the ( − 1)-st call are different then we have a collision on F here, otherwise we repeat the argument to the ( − 2)-nd call, and so on. A collision on F will be found unless M = M . More formally, given a Coll adversary A against ROX F , we will construct a Coll adversary B against F. On input key K, B runs A on the same key K to obtain two distinct messages M and M , responding to A's random oracle queries by means of the subroutines RO-Sim 1 , RO-Sim 2 depicted in 
Proof of Equation
If A is successful, then we know that h = h . If m g = m g , then these two strings form a pair of colliding inputs to F(K, ·) that B can output. Otherwise, we have that m = m . Due to the padding algorithm, each of these strings contains at least one complete 2n-bit random oracle response RO 2 (m, |M | , i ) and RO 2 (m , |M | , i ). If these are different queries to RO 2 , then the fact that m = m implies that A found a collision in RO 2 , in which case B aborts. The probability that A does so using q RO random oracle queries however is at most q RO (q RO − 1)/2 2n+1 ≤ q 2 RO /2 2n . So most likely these will actually be identical random oracle queries, meaning that |M | = |M | = λ and m = m . This means that = and that µ ν( ) = µ ν( ) ; hence, the fact that g = g implies that h −1 = h −1 .
We can now repeat the same argument for h −1 and h −1 . If m −1 g −1 = m −1 g −1 , then these strings form a pair of colliding inputs to F(K, ·). If they are equal, then because again the masks are the same, it must hold that h −2 = h −2 . We can continue this argument for m −2 g −2 and m −2 g −2 and propagate from right to left throughout the chain. However, there must exist an index I > 0 such that h I = h I but m I g I = m I g I , because otherwise M = M and the collision is not valid.
Let abort be the event that B aborts. It is clear that B wins whenever A wins and B does not abort, meaning that it is successful with probability at least
The running time of B is that of A plus up to 2 compression function evaluations.
Proof of Equation (5): Given an aSec[λ] adversary A against ROX F for any λ ∈ N, we will construct an aSec adversary B against F. The overall strategy will be that B "embeds" his own challenge message at a random point in the chain, and hopes that A's output yields a second preimage at exactly the point in the chain where B has embedded his challenge.
Algorithm B runs A to obtain a key K ∈ {0, 1} k , responding to its random oracle queries by maintaining associative arrays (K, m, i ) during its first phase, but again, the probability of it doing so is at most q RO /2 k because its view is independent of m.
Algorithm B then runs A again on input target message M , responding to its random oracle queries as before, until it outputs a second preimage M . Let m 0 . . . m ← rox-pad RO 2 (M ) be the parsed messages. For the same arguments as in the proof of Equation (2) B wins the game whenever A does and i * = I, unless A succeeded in causing a collision in RO 2 or any of the values that are programmed in RO 1 , RO 2 were already queried. Let E 1 be the event that at least one of the preprogrammed values is queried by A on a different input and E 2 be the event that A manages to find at least one collision in RO 2 . Let abort be the event that B aborts, then
Since B perfectly simulates A's environment, the advantage of B is given by
The running time of B is that of A plus at most 2 evaluations of F. Equation (5) follows.
Proof of Equation (6): Here we present the proof for Pre preservation. Given a Pre[λ] adversary
A against ROX F , we construct a Pre adversary B against F. B, on input a key K and a target value Y ∈ {0, 1} n , runs A on the same input K, Y . Note that the target hash value Y = F(K, m g) for randomly chosen m g ∈ {0, 1} b+n and K ∈ {0, 1} k , and it also has the correct distribution for A (in A's game Y is computed on inputs a random message block and the one-but-last chaining output in the computation of ROX F XORed with a random mask string).
To simulate the responses of A's random oracle queries, B runs algorithms RO-Sim 1 and RO-Sim 2 as specified in Figure 3 . Unlike the aSec and eSec games, adversary B here does not need to program any of the entries in either table. Next, B obtains a preimage M from A such that ROX
, and let h −1 be the output of the one-but-last compression function call in the computation of ROX
where m are the first k bits of M . Finally, B outputs m g as its own valid preimage. B wins the game whenever A does, so its advantage is ≥ . The running time of B is that of A plus at most evaluations of F. The rest of the proofs for the ROX construction are presented in Appendix B.
Possible tweaks. The scheme can be simplified not all seven properties need to be preserved. For example, if the key K is dropped from the input to RO 1 , the ROX construction fails to preserve eSec and ePre, but still preserves all other notions. Dropping the message bits m from the input of either RO 1 or RO 2 destroys the preservation of aSec and aPre, but leaves the preservation of other notions unharmed.
A Proofs and Counterexamples for Existing Constructions
A.1 Proof of Counterexample CE 1 Lemma A.1 If G is (t , ) atk-secure for some atk ∈ {Sec, aSec, Pre, aPre}, then CE 1 is (t, ) atk-secure for all = + 1/2 n and t = t .
Proof: We present the proofs for the case of Sec and Pre separately here. Those of aSec and aPre are almost identical and therefore omitted. atk = Sec Given an adversary A that (t, )-breaks the Sec-security of CE 1 , we build an adversary B against the Sec-security of G. Algorithm B, on input a random message M = m h ∈ {0, 1} b+n and a random key K ∈ {0, 1} k , runs A on the same input (M, K). B obtains A's second preimage M = m h and outputs it as its own colliding message. We say that M is in Case 1 if h = IV and in Case 2 if h = IV ; Cases 1 and 2 for M are defined analogously. If A is successful, i.e. CE 1 (K, M ) = CE 1 (K, M ) and M = M , then M and M must be in the same case, due to the last bit of the hash value being different in both cases. Since M is chosen at random, it is only in Case 1 with probability 1/2 n . If M and M are both in Case 2 then we must have that G(K, M ) = G(K, M ), so M is a valid second preimage for M with respect to G(K, ·). The running time of B is equal to that of A since all it does is relaying inputs and outputs. Its advantage is given by
atk = Pre Given a Pre-adversary A against CE 1 , we build a Pre-adversary B against G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K and a hash value Y ← G(K, M ) for a random message M , runs A with input Y IV n to obtain a preimage M . B returns M as its own output.
Let M = m h be the message chosen at random by the experiment. (Note that B only sees the hash value Y , not M itself.) When h = IV , the input to A is correctly distributed and B wins its game whenever A does. In the event where h = IV however, the input to A is not correctly distributed: it is given G(K, M ) IV n , while it should be given CE 1 (K, M ) = IV . This event only occurs with probability 1/2 n , and thus yields Adv
The running time of B is simply equal to that of A.
A.2 Proof of Counterexample CE 2
Lemma A.2 For any atk ∈ {Coll, eSec}, if G is (t , ) atk-secure, then CE 2 is (t, ) atk-secure for all = and t = t .
Proof: We present the proofs for Coll and eSec separately. atk = Coll Given an adversary A that (t, )-breaks the Coll-security of CE 2 , we build the following adversary B against the Coll-security of G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K, runs A on input the same key K, to obtain distinct colliding messages M and M from A. B outputs M and M as its own colliding pair. We claim that B succeeds whenever A does, or that G(
To see this, consider the following cases for (K, M ). We say that (K, Coll (A) .
The running time of B is equal to that of A since all it does is relaying inputs and outputs. atk = eSec Given an eSec adversary against CE 2 , we build an eSec adversary B against the compression function G. B runs A to obtain a target message M and outputs the same message as its target. On obtaining a random key K ∈ {0, 1} k , B runs A on the same key K until it outputs its colliding message M . B outputs the same M as its second preimage.
By a case analysis similar to that for the case of Coll above, one can show that that G(
, and hence that
The running time of B is the same as that of A.
A.3 Proof of Counterexample CE 3
Lemma A.3 If G is ( , t ) atk-secure for some atk ∈ {Sec, Pre} then CE 3 is (t, ) atk-secure for all = + 1/2 b and t = t .
Proof: We prove the lemma for atk = Sec and atk = Pre separately. atk = Sec Given an adversary A that (t, )-breaks the Sec-security of CE 3 , consider the following adversary B against the Sec-security of G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K ∈ K and a random message m h ∈ {0, 1} b+n , runs A on the same input (K, m h) to obtain a second preimage M . B returns the same message m h as its own second preimage. If A is successful, meaning that CE 4 (K, m h) = CE 4 (K, m h ) and m h = m h , we distinguish between the case that m = λ b and the case that m = λ b . In the former case, CE 3 (K, m h ) = 0 n for any h ∈ {0, 1} n , but since m is chosen at random, this case only occurs with probability 1/2 b . In the latter case, we also have that m = λ b because otherwise the last bits of the hashes are different. Therefore, we must have that
The running time of B is the same as that of A since all it does is relaying inputs and outputs. It is clear that B wins whenever A wins and B does not abort, meaning that it is successful with probability
Sec (A) − 1 2 b . atk = Pre Given a Pre-adversary A against CE 3 , we construct the following Pre-adversary B against G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K and a hash value Y ← G(K, m h) (computed for random K and m h), runs A on input Y 1 to obtain a preimage m h . B returns m h as its own preimage.
It is easy to see that when m = λ b , then the input to A is correctly distributed and B wins its game whenever A does. In the event that m = λ b , the input to A is not correctly distributed, but this only occurs with probability 1/2 b , thus yielding Proof: Given the compression function G, consider CE 6 given by
where |m 1 | = k and |m 2 | = 2n − k. Lemma A.6 If G is ( , t ) eSec-secure then CE 4 is (t, ) eSec-secure for all = + 1/2 k−1 and t = t .
The only difference with the counterexample of [BR97] is the placement of the key inside the hash (at the beginning instead of at the end). Their proof is easily seen to extend to the lemma above. When iterated as SMT CE 4 , one can see that any message of length a 2i − 1 ≤ λ ≤ a 2i+1 − 2 for i ∈ N hashes to 1 n , leading to easy constant-time eSec attacks.
Lemma A.7 If G is ( , t ) atk secure for some atk ∈ {Sec, aSec, Pre, aPre} then CE 4 is (t, ) atk-secure for all = + 1/2 n−1 and t = t .
Proof: We prove the lemma for atk = Sec and atk = Pre separately. The proofs for aSec and aPresecurity are almost identical, and they are omitted here. atk = Sec Given an adversary A that (t, )-breaks the Sec-security of CE 4 , consider the following adversary B against the Sec-security of G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K ∈ K and a random message M = m 1 . . . m a ∈ {0, 1} an and , runs A on the same inputs to obtain a second preimage M = m 1 . . . m a . B returns the same message as its own preimage. If A is successful, meaning that CE 4 (K, M ) = CE 4 (K, M ) and M = M , we distinguish between the cases that (1) m a = 0 n , that (2) m a−1 = 0 n and m a = 0 n , and (3) that m a−1 = 0 n and m a = 0 n . Since M is chosen at random, the first two cases happen with probability 1/2 n each. In the third case, we also have that m a−1 = 0 n and m a = 0 n , because otherwise the last two bits of the hashes of M and M are different. Therefore, we have that G(K, M ) = G(K, M ), so B can output M as its own second preimage. The running time of B is equal to that of A since all it does is relaying inputs and outputs. The advantage of B is that of A minus the probability that we end up in cases (1) or (2), i.e. ≥ − 2/2 n . atk = Pre Given a Pre-adversary A against CE 4 , we construct the following Pre-adversary B against G. Algorithm B, on input a random key K and a hash value Y ← G(K, M ) (computed for random M and K), runs A on input Y 10 to obtain a preimage M . B returns M as its own preimage.
Let M = m 1 m a be the message chosen at random by the experiment. It is easy to see that when m a−1 = 0 n and m a = 0 n , then the input to A is correctly distributed and B wins its game whenever A does. Otherwise, the input to A is not correctly distributed, because the target value should be CE 4 (K, M ) = 1 n or CE 4 (K, M ) = 0 n . These events only occur with probability 1/2 n each, thus yielding ≥ − 2/2 n . The running time of B is simply equal to that of A.
A.5 Proof of Counterexample CE 5
Lemma A.8 For any atk ∈ {Coll, eSec}, if G is (t , ) atk-secure then CE 5 is (t, ) atk-secure for all = and t = t .
Proof: We first describe the reductions for both Coll and eSec, and then explain why they are successful. For the case of Coll, given a Coll-adversary A against CE 5 , consider the Coll-adversary B against G that, given a key K, runs M, M $ ← A(K) and outputs M, M . For the case of eSec, given an eSec-adversary A against CE 5 , consider the eSec-adversary B against G that runs A to obtain a target message M from A, and outputs M as its own target message. On obtaining a random key K, B runs A on input K until it returns a second preimage M . B returns the same second preimage M .
We say that M is in Case 1 if CE 5 (K, M ) = 10 n−1 , corresponding to the first line of CE 5 above, in Case 2 if CE 5 (K, M ) = 1 n , corresponding to the second line, and in Case 3 otherwise, corresponding to the last line. The hash values of different cases are distinct, so for M, M to be a valid collision, they must be in the same case. They cannot be both in Case 1 or 2, because for a single key K there is only a single message in each case. Therefore, they must both be in Case 3, so that
, meaning that M, M is also a valid collision for G. Hence, B is successful whenever A is. The running time of B is also equal to that of A.
B Proofs of the ROX Construction (Theorem 5.1)
Proof of Equation (3): Given a Sec[λ]-adversary A against ROX F , we build the following Secadversary B against F. B is given as input a random key K ∈ {0, 1} k and challenge message m g ∈ Algorithm MaskRec (K, m 1 , . . . , m r , g ) 
This way, one can check that the value for g i * obtained during the hash computation is indeed g. The difference from the aSec game in the Sec one is that B programs the mask values into RO 1 before A is run (thus A has not made any random oracle queries so far) and B has no chance to abort here.
After generating M as a concatenation of random blocks with m i * = m, B runs A on inputs K and mask values µ 0 . . . µ t to obtain a second preimage M . As explained in the Proof of Equation (5), in the computation of ROX F messages M and M collide, if a collision occurs either in the final F call for |M | = |M | or for |m = m |, or in an internal F call for |M | = |M | and m = m . Note however that in the former case B aborts when a collision in RO 2 occurs. As shown in the Proof of Equation (5), this happens only with probability less or equal than q 2 RO /2 2n . It is clear that B wins the game whenever A does and i * = I, unless A succeeded in causing a collision in RO 2 . Let Coll be the event that A manages to find at least one collision in RO 2 . Since B perfectly simulates A's environment, the advantage of B given by The running time of B is that of A plus at most 2 evaluations of F. Equation (3) follows.
Proof of Equation (4): Given an eSec-adversary A against ROX F , we build the following eSecadversary B against F. B runs A to obtain the target message M . Let |M | = λ and let m be the first k bits of M . Throughout this game B simulates the answers to A's queries to RO 1 and RO 2 by running algorithms RO-Sim 1 and RO-Sim 2 as specified in Figure 3 . (K, m 1 , . . . , m i  *  , g ). It programs these into RO 1 by setting T 1 [K, m, i ] ← µ i for 0 ≤ i ≤ t. This way, one can check that the value for g i * obtained during the hash computation is indeed g. If any of the hash table entries T 1 [K, m, i ] were already defined, then B aborts. This means that A was able to predict K though, which happens with probability q RO /2 k .
Algorithm B then runs A again on input K until it outputs its second preimage M . As explained in the Proof of Equation (5) B wins the game whenever A does and i * = I, unless A succeeded in causing a collision in RO 2 or any of the mask values to be programmed in RO 1 for a given input has been already output by the RO 1 on a different input, in which cases B aborts. Let E 1 be the event that at least one of the preprogrammed masks is queried on a different input and E 2 be the event that A manages to find at least one collision in RO 2 . Let abort be the event that B aborts, then 
Proof of Equation (6): atk = ePre Given an ePre adversary A against ROX F , we construct an ePre adversary B against F. B runs A to obtain target point Y , where Y ∈ {0, 1} n . B outputs the same target value Y to get a random key input K ∈ {0, 1} k . On obtaining the same key K, A outputs a preimage M , such that ROX RO 1 ,RO 2 F (K, M ) = Y . B outputs m g as its own preimage. Here m , g and the random oracle responses to A throughout the game are defined as in the proof of Pre above. B wins the game whenever A does and and its advantage is ≥ . The running time of B is that of A plus at most evaluations of F. Equation (6) follows.
Proof of Equation (7): Given an aPre[λ] adversary A against ROX F , we construct an aPre adversary B against F for any λ ∈ N. B runs A to obtain a key K. To simulate the responses of A's random oracle queries, B runs algorithms RO-Sim 1 and RO-Sim 2 as specified in Figure 3 . B also outputs a key K and obtains a target point Y = F(K, m g) for a randomly chosen m g ∈ {0, 1} b+n . A gets the same target point Y from B.
We have to argue why the target point Y is correctly distributed to serve as an input for A. Namely, A expects a target point following the distribution induced by F(K, m g ) where m , g are as obtained in the computation of ROX RO 1 ,RO 2 F (K, M ) for a random message M ∈ {0, 1} λ , while that of B is induced by a random choice of m , g . These distributions can be seen to be identical when conditioned on the event that A did not query RO 1 or RO 2 on the correct value for m, the first k bits of M , during its first execution, which happens with probability at least 1 − (q RO /2 k ). On input Y , algorithm A outputs a preimage M such that ROX RO 1 ,RO 2 F (K, M ) = Y . B outputs m g as its own preimage, where m , g are as defined in the Proof of Equation (7).
B wins the game whenever A does, unless the distribution of the target value Y for A differs from that of B. Since that happens with probability only q RO /2 k , we measure the advantage of B by
The running time of B is that of A plus at most evaluations of F. Equation (7) follows.
